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the Bar Association which drafted Section io5i2-i9.' This Com-
mittee believed that the former statute, General Code, Section 8o3o,
was sufficiently broad to permit inheritance through the adoptive
parent, but in the face of contrary interpretation by the courts, the
Committee recommended that the additional language of Section
10512-i9 be inserted.' The court in the principal case takes cog-
nizance of this statutory development and carries out its purpose by
allowing the adopted child to inherit through its adoptive parent.
J. P. M.
EQUITY
INJUNCTION - AGAINST INEQUITABLE LITIGATION IN
FOREIGN JURISDICTION-FEDERAL EmiPLOYERS'
LIABILITY ACT
Kepner, employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was in-
jured in the course of his employment in Ohio, the state of his resi-
dence. Choosing from among the three federal forums available
under the venue section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,"
he brought an action for damages in a United States district court
for New York, where the railroad was doing business. After in-
stitution of the suit, the defendant road brought this action in an
Ohio court, asking that Kepner be enjoined from further prosecut-
ing the foreign suit, alleging that it was brought for purposes of
harrassment, that it would cause the defendant great inconvenience
and expense to defend the action 700 miles from the place of injury,
and that a federal district court in Ohio could equitably hear and
decide the case on its merits. Kepner's demurrer was sustained and
the injunction refused. On successive appeals, culminating in the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed, on the ground
that a state court may not enjoin the exercise of the right given by
13Snyder v. Swope, Director of Safety, 23 Ohio L. R. 361, 366 (1922).
1 45 U. S. C. 56, to the effect that an action under the F.E.L.A. may be brought
in the district of the residence of the defendant, in the district in which the cause of
action arose, or in the district in which the defendant is doing busir ' at the time of
tke bringing of the action.
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the FELA (Federal Employers' Liability Act) to sue in a federal
court in a foreign state. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62
Sup. Ct. 6 (941).
It is a well established rule that a court of equity, having juris-
diction of the person, may enjoin a plaintiff from prosecuting a suit
in.a foreign jurisdiction when that choice of forum results in un-
fair advantage to him as against the defendant.2  Conversely, under
the well-recognized doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court hav-
ing statutory jurisdiction may decline its facilities to a suit that in
all justice should be tried in another forum.' These two rules have
been applied by the vast majority of the courts in cases arising un-
der the venue sections of most federal statutes, and under the venue
section of the FELA where the action for damages has been brought
in a foreign state court,4 such courts being given jurisdiction concur-
rent with that of federal courts by this act. But wvhere one within
the F. E. L. A. takes advantage of the venue laid in a distant federal
court, the Supreme Court now ratifies the position already taken by
inferior courts that such a plaintiff is immune to the twin techniques
of forum non conveniens and injunction of foreign suit, by which
the interstate adjustment of the place of trial in civil actions is or-
dinarily administered.
The majority opinion of the Federal Supreme Court lacking any
satisfactory explanation for the judicial course thus taken, it is nec-
essary to look to the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court for an at-
tempted rationale.r That court based its argument on the premise
that the section of the F. E. L. A. conferring jurisdiction on the
three federal courts is a command to the various courts named to
hear any eligible case presented to them. This command is such as
to deny to the federal courts the right to exercise the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. From this unprecedented finding, the court
concluded that there was vested in the plaintiff a "federal right,"
with which there must be no interference. Buttressing this reasoning
2State ex rel. R. R. Co. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S. AV. (2d) 272 (1932); B. & 0.
Rd. v. Bole, 31 F. Supp. 221 (1940); B. & 0. Rd. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (1941);
Crandall v. Hobbe, 53 F. (2d) 969 (1931).
3 Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Inc., 285 U. S. 413 (1931); Massachu-
setts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123
(1932).
4 Injunctions granted to restrain the prosecution of a suit in a foreign state court:
State ex rel. R. R. Co. v. Nortoni, 331 Mo. 764, 55 S. W. (2d) 272 (1932); Reed's
Administratrix v. Illinois Central R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. AV. 794 (1940); Kern v.
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933).
'B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N. E. (2d) 982 (1940).
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by the Ohio court, and constituting the one coherent argument of-
fered by the United States Supreme Court, was the resort to the
legislative history of the Act as demonstrating Congressional intent
to confer on the plaintiff an unqualified right to sue in any one of
the three tribunals provided. The acknowledged power to enjoin
suit under the F. E. L. A. in a foreign state court was distinguished
by Ohio's high court on the ground that jurisdiction and venue for
such suits cannot be made mandatory upon the state courts by Con-
gress. State courts thus possessing only a discretionary jurisdiction,
the plaintiff has but a potential privilege, from the enjoyment of
which he can be enjoined in appropriate cases.
The legislative history of the F. E. L. A., however, lends little
support to this line of reasoning. True, it was to relieve the em-
ployee of the inequitable restriction of his action to the district in
which the defendant railroad was an inhabitant that the venue sec-
tion was amended in i91o to admit his action to other courts. But
it does not follow that because Congress sought to relieve one in-
cquitable situation it intended to do so at the needless expense of
creating another. Rather, it seems more reasonable to impute to
Congress the intent to make possible, through affording a choice of
federal courts, judicial manipulation of jurisdiction in these cases
with an eye to the equity of the particular situation. Furthermore,
neither legislative nor sound judicial precedent supports the judg-
nent entered in the instant litigation. Analyses of -the decisions
which the principal case now canonizes into a fixed rule reveals
them to be equivocal, forced, or poorly reasoned.6 Against them
are ranged three unanimous Supreme Court determinations,' cited
by the dissenters in the Federal Supreme Court, to the effect that
6 In B. & 0. v. Clew., 36 F. Supp. 703 (1940) a disappointed Judge Baker, who the
year previous had expressly stated that the venue section of the F.E.L.A. was not
intvnded to, and does not, limit Equity's power to restrain persons within its jurisdiction
from extrcising a purely legal right in an unjust and inequitable manner in a foreign
juridicti'.n (B. & 0. R. R. v,. Bole, 31 F. Supp. 221), reluctantly bowed to the precedent
-4 L. 5' 0. v. Vigor, 17 P. Supp. 602 (1936) with which he had not previously been
acquainted, and denied Equity's power to enjoin suits brought undr the F.E.L.A. in
federal courts.
In C. 0 0. v. Vi'zjr, 17 F. Sulpp. 602 (1936), the court, while seeming to rely on all
ithe arguments prorounded by the group denying the right of Equity to enjoin these suits,
amd while refusing to grant the injunction requested, did not come out and state un-
equivocally that such a suit could never be enjoined, but rather stated that insufficient
groand3 were shon to justify the granting of the injunctive relief prayed for. The
impression is left that the court, in a case of extreme hardship, would not be adverse
to granting an injunction.
7Atchison Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924); 'Michigan Central v. Mix, 278 U. S.
492 (1929); Denver Ry. v. Terti, 284 U. S. 284 (1932).
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a Congressional declaration that a federal court has jurisdiction is
not an inflexible demand for the exercise of the court's authority,
to the unnecessary injury of the defendant and the public. And if
the privilege given to the plaintiff to choose the court in which to
bring his suit under the F. E. L. A. be regarded as an absolute com-
mand to the federal courts to take jurisdiction without regard to
considerations of justice and fairness, it would seem that the same
effect should be given to other federal venue provisions providing
several courts with jurisdiction and venue. But such is not the
case, although the language of the F. E. L. A. is similar to that of
comparable venue sections."
Nor is it undebatable, if Congress did actually intend the effect
of the F. E. L. A. to be that which has now been judicially, attrib-
uted to it, that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact
such legislation. The extent of that authority is directly responsive
to the distinction between jurisdiction and power; Congress has un-
questioned control over the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts,
but its authority to infringe upon the inherent powers of the federal
courts is limited to minor regulation." If forum zon conveniens be
viewed as a device to aid in the determination of a proper place of
trial, then in a broad sense a statute of this tenor might well be re-
garded as a valid Congressional regulation of federal court jurisdic-
tion. But if the doctrine be taken in its immediate sense, such a
statute concerns the power of a court of equity to exercise its full
judicial function, and on the authority of the Michaelson case
would be unconstitutional. If the latter view were followed, federal
courts could exercise their discretion in cases seeking a hearing in
their forum, there would be no basis on which to distinguish the
suits in federal and those in state courts, and the power of the state
court to enjoin a resident in its jurisdiction from bringing his action
in a distant federal court would be a natural sequitur.
W. C. D.
828 U.S.C.A. 112 (suits based on diversity of citizenship).
28 U.S.C.A. 53 (suits by or against China Trade Act corporations).
28 U.S.C.A. 105 (suits for recovery of taxes).
Michaelson v. United States, 291 Fed. 940 (1923).
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